Introduction
The levying of taxes is imperative for a government to ensure that it achieves its economic objectives 1 which, amongst others, include the economic development of the country and regulating the levels of employment. 2 The South African Revenue Service (SARS) is empowered to administer and collect taxes in South Africa, 3 and value-added tax (VAT) is one of the forms of tax collected by SARS. 4 VAT is collected by registered vendors 5 on the supply of goods and services in South Africa and on the importation of goods and services to South Africa. 6 VAT is therefore concerned with the consumption of goods and services in South Africa. 7 In terms of the VAT system, the vendor may deduct: 8 tax incurred on enterprise inputs (input tax) from the tax collected on supplies made by the enterprise (output tax).
In accordance with the "pay now, argue later" rule, a taxpayer who disputes the assessed amount payable to SARS will still be obliged to pay this amount -even though an objection to the assessment has been lodged. This obligation is furthermore not suspended when an appeal against a disallowance is lodged.
22
If section 34 of the Constitution, 23 which affords every person the right of access to court, is borne in mind, the question arises whether this rule is constitutional or not, as it seems not to allow access to the court before payment is made. 24 On the other hand, if the "pay now, argue later" rule were not implemented by SARS, there would be an incentive for a taxpayer to dispute an assessment, which the taxpayer would not otherwise have done. 25 This might lead to frivolous objections 26 which could cause SARS and the South African government to experience dire financial constraints.
It is therefore clear that a balance between a taxpayer's rights and SARS's duty to effectively collect tax must be achieved. In the matter of Metcash Trading Ltd v
Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service, 27 the Constitutional Court held that such a balance had in fact been achieved and thus declared the "pay now, argue later" rule relating to VAT to be constitutionally sound. In view of the principle of stare decisis, 28 this Constitutional Court decision is binding on all courts, unless it can be shown that the court erred. Section 105 of the TAA, which was promulgated on 4 July 2012, provides that the "pay now, argue later" rule is applicable to an objection to an assessment and the lodging of an appeal against the disallowance of an objection. The Act will come into operation on a date to be determined by the president by proclamation in the Government Gazette, as indicated in s 272 of the Act. See Pato and Spira 2009 www.saica.co.za on the amendments of s 88 of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962, which section is similar to s 36 of the VAT Act.
23
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 -hereafter "the Constitution".
24
See 2.4.2 herein.
25
Arnold Opinion.
26
Arnold Opinion. Despite the fact that the section 36 rule has been found to be constitutionally sound, the present article argues that it poses some constitutional and other problems, and, accordingly, that there might be sufficient grounds for the courts to deviate from this precedent. The article further discusses whether the section 164 rule corrects the constitutional problems experienced with the section 36 rule.
In order to fully appreciate the section 164 rule, it is essential to discuss in detail the section 36 rule and the effect thereof. Firstly, the contextual setting of the section 36 rule is explored, and, thereafter the constitutionality of the section 36 rule is investigated. This investigation is conducted with specific reference to Metcash
Trading Ltd v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service, 30 in which the courts had to deal with a constitutional attack on section 36 of the VAT Act.
After the discussion of the section 36 rule, the focus of this article will shift to the section 164 rule. Here it will be determined whether the section 164 rule addresses the problems experienced with the section 36 rule.
Section 36 rule

Content
Section 36 states that the payment of tax will not be suspended pending an objection or an appeal unless the commissioner directs otherwise. 31 A taxpayer desiring suspension of the payment of tax can, however, request a suspension.
32
The commissioner can deny a taxpayer's request, or revoke the decision to suspend the payment of tax, if he or she is satisfied that the objection or appeal is frivolous, is being used as a dilatory tactic or because material changes have occurred since the suspension was granted.
33
It must be noted that in the event of the objection or appeal being successful an adjustment, including interest, 34 will be made. 35 Even though the payment of interest is to be welcomed, 36 it must be pointed out that this may not prevent the taxpayer from experiencing financial ruin if he or she has to pay the assessed amount pending an appeal. 
Contextual setting
In order to appreciate the extent of the section 36 rule, the context in which the "pay now, argue later" rule is applied must be considered, as the "pay now, argue later" rule is not applied in isolation. The consequences if a taxpayer fails to pay the assessed amount pending an objection or an appeal are relevant, as SARS is afforded further powers to enforce the collection of taxes due.
If the taxpayer does not honour his or her obligation to pay tax pending an objection or an appeal against a disallowance, SARS may, firstly, implement the statement procedure as provided for in section 40(2)(a) of the VAT Act.
38
In terms of this procedure, the commissioner may file a statement indicating the outstanding tax, interest or penalty payable, with the clerk or registrar of a 33 Section 36(4) of the VAT Act.
34
See SARS 2011 www.sars.gov.za regarding the interest rates.
35
Section 36(5) of the VAT Act. In these circumstances, SARS will issue a revised assessment. Consequently, a taxpayer's failure to pay tax pending an objection or an appeal against a disallowance may result in SARS obtaining a civil judgment or ordering a third party to act as an agent of the taxpayer. The "pay now, argue later" rule, on its own, does not guarantee the effective collection of taxes but the enforcement procedures are such that SARS is assured of effectively collecting taxes.
The need for SARS to be able to collect taxes efficiently and effectively is freely acknowledged, but it is important that a taxpayer's constitutional rights as a taxpayer should also be considered. In this instance (namely that of a taxpayer), an assessed amount that has been questioned, either by way of objection or appeal, will still be due and payable and SARS's right to recover the money from the taxpayer will not be stayed. It seems that a taxpayer's right against self-help, as embodied in section 34 of the Constitution, will be restricted by the application of the section 36 rule, as SARS can enforce the statement procedure or declare a third party an agent of the taxpayer.
The court will therefore be able to move on to the second stage.
The second stage examines whether the limitation is a reasonable and justifiable limitation based on the concepts of human dignity, equality and freedom. 63 In order to ascertain whether or not the limitation is reasonable and justifiable, the court must consider the nature and extent of the limitation, the importance of the purpose of the limitation, as well as the relation between the limitation and the said purpose.
Furthermore, the court must consider if there are less invasive means available, and must also consider the nature of the right that is being limited.
64
If it is a reasonable and justifiable limitation, the impediment will be allowed. In the event that it is not reasonable and justifiable, the practice will be unconstitutional.
Section 36 of the Constitution sets out factors which the court has to take into consideration when determining if a limitation is reasonable and justifiable. These factors must not be seen as comprising a check list, but rather as part of a balancing act. 65 When weighing up these factors, the following dictum must be kept in mind:
66
[T]he Court places the purpose, effects and importance of the infringing legislation on one side of the scales and the nature and effect of the infringement caused by the legislation on the other.
When a court has to deal with the constitutionality of the section 36 rule, it will have to weigh the purpose, effect and importance of the "pay now, argue later" rule against the nature and effect of this rule on a person's right of access to the courts.
The purpose of the "pay now, argue later rule" is to effect the speedy collection of taxes. 67 These taxes are used to improve the country's economic development and to regulate levels of employment. 68 With the "pay now, argue later" rule, SARS can reduce the number of frivolous objections and guarantee that the treasury will not be prejudiced by a delay in payments. 69 On the other side of the scale will be the impact of the "pay now, argue later" rule on the right of access to the courts, as the taxpayer is prima facie obliged to pay the assessed amount before approaching the court.
The Metcash Trading Ltd judgment is now discussed with these general principles in mind. the objection was disallowed by SARS. 71 The applicant was also notified that, if he did not effect payment, SARS would implement its summary procedure.
72
Metcash, in response, approached the High Court on an urgent basis. A consent order was granted to the effect that the applicant must lodge an application before a specific date to have sections 36, 40(2)(a) and 40(5) of the VAT Act declared contrary to sections 25(1) and 34 of the Constitution.
73 SARS undertook not to enforce the summary procedure before the specific date.
Court a quo
The question before the court a quo was whether sections 36, 40(2)(a) and 40 (5) [t]he prospect that an eventual successful appeal might reverse the situation is no answer to the actual infringement which endures until then.
Accordingly, the first stage of the constitutional evaluation was successful and the court moved on to examine whether the said infringement was reasonable and justifiable.
The commissioner argued that a reasonable and justifiable limitation was created for the following reasons, amongst others:
 frivolous objections would be made to delay the payment of taxes;
 fraudulent and dishonest tax returns would be encouraged;
 South Africa could not afford a situation where taxpayers do not pay promptly.
79
The court held that a delay in casu would not have such a big impact, considering the greater scheme of national tax. 80 It was further held that the limitation of a person's right of access to the court was extensive and that, even though it might be only temporary in nature, the effect could be ominous and permanent. 81 The limitation was accordingly held not to be reasonable and justifiable. 
Constitutional Court
The minister of finance and the commissioner for SARS opposed confirmation of the order granted in the court a quo. 86 They argued that the limitation was reasonable and justifiable as there were adequate opportunities for a taxpayer to have a hearing on the assessment.
87
Metcash supported the ruling and reasoning of Snyders J in the court a quo.
88 It contended that the opportunities for a "hearing" on the assessment referred to by the respondent were insufficient, as the taxpayer was in effect compelled to pay and hope that he or she would get the money back at a later stage. 89 The applicant submitted that there were less invasive means available to SARS to effect the speedy collection of taxes. 90 These means included the imposition of higher interest rates, time-linked penalties and the furnishing of security.
91
The court indicated that section 36(1) had two objectives, namely to ensure that the obligation of an aggrieved taxpayer to pay tax not be delayed pursuant to other remedies, and secondly that the necessary refunds be made later. 92 Kriegler J therefore held that the "pay now, argue later" rule was not concerned with access to the court and contained no provision ousting the court's jurisdiction. 93 It is submitted that the Metcash Trading Ltd (CC) judgment was concerned only with the application of the "pay now, argue later" rule in relation to VAT and has no binding effect on other tax legislation. The considerations that influenced the court in arriving at this decision in relation to VAT would not necessarily lead to the same conclusion in relation to income tax matters.
On the other hand, unlike Croome, Olivier is of the opinion that the Constitutional Court erred on several counts in its judgment. On the basis of Olivier's criticism, it is submitted that the constitutional attack on the section 36 rule lies therein that the right of access to the courts, as contained in section 34 of the Constitution, aims to prevent self-help. The court should thus have examined whether this rule, at the time it is invoked, unreasonably permits SARS to "help itself" and become the judge in its own case. The question, therefore, should not be whether the taxpayer will have access to the courts at some stage, but rather whether the taxpayer will have the opportunity to access the courts before being obliged to pay the assessed amount.
Olivier further points out that, in theory, the possible judicial review of the commissioner's discretion not to suspend a taxpayer's payment pending an appeal does allow a taxpayer access to the courts, but, according to her, the grounds of review are fairly narrow.
114
It must also be borne in mind that the remedies available when a court reviews the commissioner's discretion not to suspend payment are limited. In terms of section 8 of PAJA, the court can grant an order directing the commissioner to provide reasons or reconsider the decision. However, the court does not have the power to overturn the commissioner's decision. She concludes that the court did not deal with the argument raised by the applicant that there are less invasive ways to effect speedy collection of tax. 125 The possibility that there are less invasive ways to for SARS to achieve its objective is one of the factors the court would have had to consider in terms of section 36 of the Constitution.
Post Metcash Trading Ltd (CC)
Guidelines
After the Constitutional Court judgment, SARS issued Media Release 27. This release set out the circumstances in which the commissioner may exercise his or her discretion in suspending payment pending an appeal that might be decided in favour of the taxpayer. One such example was when payment of the whole amount would cause irreversible damage if the taxpayer's appeal were successful, and where the circumstances of the matter created reasonable doubt.
126
The TLSA has further clarified the "pay now, argue later" rule by amending section 88 of the Income Tax Act and section 36 of the VAT Act. 127 The sections were amended to set out the factors that the commissioner may take into consideration when exercising his or her discretion to suspend a payment pending an appeal, and include the following: He furthermore indicates that it is unclear whether the fraud referred to in the amended section refers only to alleged fraud or to an actual fraud conviction. If an allegation of fraud is taken into consideration, this would be unfair, as the taxpayer will not have had the opportunity to defend himself or herself against the allegation. however, not be the case when a taxpayer is rendered insolvent. The objection and appeal procedure may take a substantial amount of time, which could severely prejudice a taxpayer and even lead to the taxpayer's sequestration or liquidation.
In Mokoena v CSARS 137 and Capstone, the respective courts came to entirely different conclusions on a pertinent aspect of the rule. 138 In the former case the court held that while SARS is competent to demand payment of tax pending an objection or appeal based on the "pay now, argue later" rule it may not obtain judgment in the interim. 139 This decision was criticised in Capstone, as the filing of a statement does not amount to a judgment. 140 Binns-Ward J conceded that, even though it is not a judgment in the ordinary sense, it has the effect of a judgment, as SARS is able to obtain a writ of execution.
141
It is apparent that, even though the "pay now, argue later" rule in terms of the section 36 rule was held to be constitutional and further guidelines were provided, the application of the "pay now, argue later" rule is still problematic.
With the enactment of the TAA, the "pay now, argue later" rule is provided for in terms of section 164 of the TAA. This article will now proceed to focus on the "pay October 2012. 143 This act aims to "provide for the effective and efficient collection of tax". 144 It is therefore clear that the TAA was enacted to assist SARS in its duty to collect tax. This is achieved, amongst other ways, by "aligning the administration of the tax Acts".
145
If a taxpayer is liable for the payment of tax in terms of a provision in a tax act, for instance the VAT Act, the tax administration will be done in terms of the TAA, except if the TAA is silent with regard to the administration in that instance.
146
The TAA specifically deals with the situation of the payment of tax pending an objection or an appeal. Accordingly, since 1 October 2012 the "pay now, argue later" rule will be dealt with in terms of section 164 of the TAA.
Content
Section 164 of the TAA stipulates that the obligation of a taxpayer to pay tax will not be suspended pending an objection or an appeal unless a senior SARS official indicates otherwise. 147 A taxpayer can request a senior SARS official to suspend the 142 Vanek 2012 www.moneywebtax.co.za.
143
In terms of s 272 of the TAA, the president determined, by means of Proc 51 in GG 35687, that the TAA, except for certain provisions, would come into operation on 1 October 2012.
144
Section 2 of the TAA.
145
Section 2(a) of the TAA.
146
Sections 4(1) and 4(2) of the TAA. If the TAA is silent with regard to the administration in a specific instance, the provisions of the relevant tax act will apply.
payment if the taxpayer intends to lodge an objection or an appeal against an assessment. 148 The official will take into consideration the amount involved, the taxpayer's compliance history, whether the taxpayer might alienate his or her assets during the postponement of payment, the taxpayer's ability to furnish security, whether the payment pending an objection or an appeal would cause irreparable financial hardship, and if there are any imminent sequestration or liquidation proceedings pending. The official will also consider if the taxpayer has failed to furnish required information or if any fraud is involved.
149
A taxpayer's request may be denied or a suspension may be revoked if the objection is frivolous or is used by the taxpayer simply to delay the payment of tax.
Furthermore, the suspension can be revoked if a material change has occurred since the official decided to suspend payment.
150
In terms of section 164(6), SARS is prohibited from invoking recovery proceedings for a period commencing on the day SARS receives a request for suspension, or a previously granted suspension is revoked, and ending ten business days after a notice of SARS's decision regarding suspension or revocation is issued. This means that, once the taxpayer has requested a suspension in terms of section 164(2), the enforcement proceedings 151 are prohibited until ten days after SARS has delivered its decision to reject a suspension request or revoke a suspension. SARS is, however, permitted to continue with the collection procedures if it has a reasonable belief that the taxpayer may alienate assets.
152
In the event that an assessment is altered by SARS in accordance with an objection or an appeal, SARS will make a due adjustment. These enforcement proceedings can include, amongst others, the statement procedure and the appointment of a taxpayer's agent.
Section 164(6) of the TAA.
terms of section 164 of the TAA. The section indicates factors that a SARS official may consider in suspending the payment of tax pending an objection or an appeal.
Nevertheless, the enforcement of the tax due to SARS is initially suspended until ten days after SARS has decided whether or not to suspend the payment of tax.
Contextual setting
As with the section 36 rule, 154 the context in which the section 164 rule is applied is of importance. What, for instance, would the consequences be if the payment of tax pending an objection or an appeal were not suspended?
Like the section 36 rule, the section 164 rule affords SARS further powers to enforce the collection of taxes due. These powers include, amongst others, the appointment of a third party as an agent of the taxpayer 155 and the statement procedure.
156
Mention must also be made of the fact that section 172(2) specifically states that SARS may apply the statement procedure even though an objection or an appeal is lodged, unless a suspension has been granted.
It is, therefore, important to note that, if a taxpayer's obligation to pay tax pending an objection or an appeal is not suspended, SARS can actively take steps to enforce the collection of tax.
This leads one to ask if there are any substantive differences between the section 36 rule and the section 164 rule.
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See 2.1 herein.
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Section 179 of the TAA. This section is similar to the s 47 procedure in terms of the VAT Act. See 2.2 herein for a brief discussion of this procedure.
156
Section 172 of the TAA. This section is similar to the s 40(2)(a) procedure in terms of the VAT Act. See 2.2 herein for a brief discussion of this procedure.
Section 36 rule v section 164 rule
Both rules provide for the practice of "pay now, argue later" and the wording of these two sections is similar. The section 164 rule deviates from the section 36 rule in only two respects.
Firstly, in terms of the section 164 rule, a senior SARS official has the authority to suspend the payment of tax, whilst with the section 36 rule only the commissioner had this authority.
157
Secondly, section 164(6) of the TAA contains a unique section. In terms of this provision, SARS is prohibited from taking collection steps during the period of considering a suspension request and ten days after issuing a notice of denial or revocation of the suspension.
158
It needs to be determined whether these changes in terms of section 164(6) of the TAA address the problems identified regarding the "pay now, argue later" rule in terms of section 36 of the VAT Act. 
Section 164 rule -addressing problems
In the discussion on the constitutionality of the section 36 rule, certain problems were highlighted. 160 Further problems were then identified with the section 36 rule in the discussion of the problems arising after Metcash Trading Ltd. Olivier's main points of criticism levelled at the section 36 rule are, firstly, that, at the time the rule is invoked, the court's jurisdiction is excluded. The question that arises from this criticism is if SARS is unreasonably permitted to become the judge in its own case by being able to enforce its collection procedures despite an objection or an appeal being lodged. 162 Secondly, Olivier indicates that there might be less invasive means available which will assist in achieving a balance between SARS's duty and the taxpayer's right of access to the courts.
163
The fact that section 164(1) allows for a senior SARS official, instead of the commissioner of SARS, to suspend the payment of tax pending an objection or an appeal only has the effect that the commissioner's powers are delegated. It does not address the problem that SARS is permitted to enforce the collection of tax even though an objection or an appeal has been lodged. Furthermore, authorising a senior SARS official to consider suspending the payment does not make the procedure less invasive if the request to have the payment suspended is rejected.
Therefore, the first change in terms of the "pay now, argue later" rule will not have a significant impact on a taxpayer's right of access to the courts.
The change in terms of section 164(6) of the TAA provides a taxpayer with a degree of legal certainty, because the taxpayer is guaranteed that SARS will not continue with any collection steps for a certain period, as the collection of tax is stayed for such a period. As a result, SARS will reach a decision regarding the request for suspending the payment pending an objection or an appeal as soon as possible to ensure that it can continue collecting tax rapidly.
It follows that SARS will have an incentive to reach a swift decision, namely to be able to proceed with enforcement as soon as a request for suspension is rejected. The guidelines provided for in terms of the TLSA were also criticised. The opinion was expressed that SARS acts as a judge in a matter to which it is a party.
Furthermore, the weight, meaning and relevance of some of these factors were criticised. 167 The guidelines provided for in terms of the TLSA are replicated in section 164(3) of the TAA. The criticism levelled at the section 36(3) factors will therefore still obtain in respect of the section 164 rule. Accordingly, the section 164(3) rule does not address the problems identified previously.
168
The TAA does, however, address the confusion that arose in Mokoena regarding whether or not SARS may proceed with the collection of tax even though an objection or an appeal has been lodged. Section 172(2) of the TAA specifically states that SARS may proceed with the statement procedure even though an objection or an appeal is lodged, provided that the obligation has not been suspended in terms of section 164 of the TAA. It is therefore confirmed that SARS may proceed with the statement procedure if the payment of tax is not suspended.
164
In terms of s 6(e)(iii), this will constitute a ground for judicial review in terms of PAJA. 
Conclusion
It was established, when examining the constitutionality of the "pay now, argue later" rule, that a balance has to be achieved between the speedy collection of taxes and the taxpayer's right to approach the court. The court held in Metcash Trading Ltd (CC) that this balance is in fact achieved and, accordingly, that the "pay now,
argue later" rule is constitutional.
Two issues must, however, be kept in mind. Firstly, Metcash Trading Ltd (CC) dealt with the "pay now, argue later" rule in terms of the VAT Act. Therefore it does not create a precedent regarding income tax matters. The court still needs to determine whether the "pay now, argue later" rule in income tax matters will muster constitutional scrutiny.
Secondly, the courts will be bound by the Metcash Trading Ltd (CC) decision unless it can be shown that this decision was wrong. Numerous arguments made by Olivier may assist a taxpayer in proving that the court erred, in the Metcash Trading Ltd (CC) judgment, in declaring section 36 of the VAT Act to be constitutional.
Since 1 October 2012, the "pay now, argue later" rule has, however, been provided for in terms of section 164 of the TAA. The question that arose was whether or not the problems identified with regard to the section 36 rule would be addressed by section 164 of the TAA. Owing to the fact that the wording is fairly similar to that of section 36 of the VAT Act, the section 164 rule does not address the problems. In fact, it is possible that the new rule may lead to other problems.
It is thus submitted that the legislature has failed to make productive use of the opportunity to draft legislation that would achieve a balance between SARS's duty and a taxpayer's right of access to the courts. 
